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Response 
The National Surveillance State:  
A Response to Balkin  
Orin S. Kerr† 
In his recent Lockhart lecture, published in this journal as 
The Constitution in the National Surveillance State,1 Jack Bal-
kin warns of a “new form of governance” that he calls “the Na-
tional Surveillance State.”2 Balkin argues that new technolo-
gies have triggered a new approach to governance that changes 
what government can do and how it does it.3  
According to Balkin, the National Surveillance State 
“grows naturally out of the Welfare State and the National Se-
curity State”4 and “seeks any and all information that assists 
governance.”5 The National Surveillance State is threatening 
because it focuses on prevention ex ante rather than prosecu-
tion ex post, and because it can use private/public partnerships 
to circumvent constitutional limits on government.6 Balkin 
leaves us with a question: Will the National Surveillance State 
be an “authoritarian information state” that controls us, or a 
“democratic information state” that we the citizenry control?7 
 
†  Professor, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to the 
editors of the Minnesota Law Review for inviting me to publish this response.  
 1. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. See id. (“Government’s increasing use of surveillance and data mining 
is a predictable result of accelerating developments in information technolo-
gy.”). 
 4. Id. at 5. 
 5. Id. at 11. 
 6. See id. at 15–17 (describing the “three major dangers for our freedom” 
posed by the National Surveillance State). 
 7. See id. at 17–18. 
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Like Balkin, I would insist on the latter.8 But I think Bal-
kin’s essay somewhat misses the point of the changes he de-
scribes. In my view, we aren’t seeing a “new form of gover-
nance.” The form of governance remains very much the same. 
Rather, what Balkin describes is part of a broader societal shift 
away from human observation and towards computerization. 
The widespread use of computers and the introduction of digi-
tal information have caused important changes in how individ-
uals can learn what others are doing. The government’s reac-
tion to these changes, while highly visible, is only a small part 
of the picture.  
In this brief response, I will explain why the changes Bal-
kin details should be understood as a technology problem in-
stead of a governance problem. Technology has changed, and 
the law should shift in response. This approach is both more 
accurate and more likely to prove politically appealing; it sug-
gests solutions that draw support from a wide political base ra-
ther than a narrow one. 
I.  THE SHIFT TO COMPUTERIZATION   
In the past, information ordinarily was collected and 
shared using the human senses. We generally knew what we 
knew because we had either seen it directly or heard it from 
someone else. Knowledge was based entirely on personal obser-
vation. If you wanted to know what was happening, you had to 
go out and take a look. You had to see what was happening and 
observe it with your own eyes, or at least speak to those who 
had done so to get a second-hand account. The human senses 
regulated everything.  
That is gradually changing. More and more, our daily lives 
are assisted by and occur through computer networks.9 Com-
puter networks are extraordinary tools for doing remotely what 
we used to have to do in person. It seems like we barely need to 
leave home anymore. We wake up in the morning and check 
Facebook, using the network to send and receive messages. We 
make our purchases online, using the network to select and or-
der goods. If we go outside and head to lunch—yes, some people 
 
 8. See id. at 25 (hoping that the United States can surmount the prob-
lems caused by the National Surveillance State in order to “preserve constitu-
tional values and democratic self-government”). 
 9. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Proce-
dure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 309 (2005) (describing how the shift to compu-
terization has affected criminal activity and investigations). 
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do actually still “go outside”—we probably pay for the meal 
with a credit card. All of these routine steps are facilitated by 
computer networks.  
If you’re interested in knowing what’s happening in a com-
puter network, the human senses alone aren’t enough. You 
can’t just look around in the network. You can’t just listen to 
hear what’s happening. Instead, knowing what’s happening re-
quires collecting and analyzing data from the networks them-
selves. The network contains information zipping around the 
world, and the only way to know what is happening is to ana-
lyze it. Specifically, some device must collect the information, 
and some device must manipulate it.10 The result is a substitu-
tion effect: Work that used to be done entirely by the human 
senses now must be done in part by tools.  
The shift from information collection via the human senses 
to information collection via tools means a general switch in 
how a person or institution might learn what is happening in 
the world. The old powers are out: Institutions can no longer 
simply send an individual out and ask him to collect informa-
tion with his senses. Instead, devices must be installed and 
configured to collect the data. And once collected, the informa-
tion must be processed and analyzed so that it makes sense to 
whomever wants to use it to understand what is happening on 
the network. In the computer network environment, the work 
traditionally performed by the human senses is increasingly 
done by computer data collection and analysis. 
Professor Balkin looks at these changes and sees a new 
form of government, a new “National Surveillance State.”11 But 
these changes are not so much a “new form of governance” as a 
new playing field for the old one. The government’s goals ha-
ven’t changed. Just as before, the public wants the government 
to catch bad guys. Just as before, the public wants terrorists 
caught and criminals prosecuted. But that old job must now be 
done in a new way. The switch to networks means that infor-
mation must be obtained and then analyzed using tools. Some-
one must install the tools; someone must configure them; and 
someone must analyze them. 
 
 10.  See Balkin, supra note 1, at 7–11 (discussing the ways in which data 
from a whole variety of networks is collected and analyzed). 
 11. See id. at 3. 
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II.  THE NEW PLAYING FIELD AND POLITICAL APPEAL   
Why does it matter whether we see the changes as a “new 
form of governance” or just a new playing field? It matters be-
cause it points to a different solution for a different audience. 
Balkin sees a governance problem, so he looks to the traditional 
governance solutions: Judicial review, legislative oversight, and 
oversight within the executive branch.12 His approach appeals 
to a civil-libertarian audience. The “National Surveillance 
State” evokes George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four,13 and it 
calls on us to remain vigilant against the traditional threat of 
excessive government power.14 But surely a civil-libertarian 
audience is already on board with Balkin’s agenda. That au-
dience needs no prompting to demand more oversight of gov-
ernment surveillance and data mining. 
In contrast, framing the issue as a technology problem can 
appeal to a much broader political audience. It enables refor-
mers to make an institutionally conservative argument for 
change: If technology has changed, the law should change with 
it to restore the status quo ante. Instead of inspiring civil-
libertarians, the argument appeals to a Burkean conservative 
commitment to prior institutional settlements. Further, it fo-
cuses attention on technical issues that can draw broad agree-
ment rather than ideological claims that tend to trigger disa-
greement and distrust. 
Consider an example. In an era of human observation, the 
law focuses almost exclusively on information collection. When 
a person observes evidence, it is relatively difficult to share and 
analyze it. The information is stored only in the human mind, 
and the person who knows it must consciously decide to share 
that information with a particular person at a particular time. 
It takes energy. Further, over time memory fades, and the in-
formation disappears along with it. These practical realities 
tend to impose natural limits on how much and when evidence 
that is collected will be used and distributed. Computers, how-
ever, are not so limited. They are remarkably efficient tools for 
distributing and preserving data. They can store everything, 
distribute data anywhere in an instant, and configure data in a 
way that can be broadly subjected to many different types of 
analysis for many different reasons.  
 
 12. See id. at 20–25. 
 13.  GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
 14. See id. at 24 (“The best way to control the watchers is to watch them 
as well.”). 
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The shift to computerization presents an easy case for the 
expanded role of use restrictions in privacy law. When the law 
imposes a use restriction, it imposes limitations on what an 
entity can do with information after it has been collected.15 In 
the past, the law focused on evidence collection: The frailty and 
imperfection of the human mind made use restrictions general-
ly unnecessary.16 But computers have brought the cost of total 
memory to zero, and that shift means that the law must now 
play the role that the practicalities of human observation once 
played. The argument doesn’t depend on public fear of the ex-
ecutive branch, as does the notion of the new “National Surveil-
lance State.”17 Rather, it is based on the simple dynamic of 
technological change: To restore the status quo, the law should 
make hard what technology has made easy. 
The technological narrative also carves out a natural role 
for oversight focused on efficacy. It reminds us that surveil-
lance and data mining are always goal-dependent: When as-
sessing a particular program, the focus must be on what works. 
If a surveillance tool or program doesn’t work, it shouldn’t be 
used. This seems obvious, but tends to become lost in practice. I 
recently served on a committee of the National Academy of 
Sciences that studied the problem of government data mining, 
and I was struck by how often programs exist with no evidence 
of whether they actually work.18 In my view, the mindset that 
allows such programs to exist without analyzing their efficacy 
 
 15. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions 
Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 77–92 (1995) (describing 
how the transformation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to con-
troversial use restrictions on seized information). 
 16. At least this is the case when the law regulates evidence collection. 
Use restrictions have played an important role where the law has regulated 
evidence collection very lightly, as in the case of grand jury secrecy. See FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
 17. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 21 (“Without appropriate checks and 
oversight mechanisms, executive officials . . . . will increase secrecy, avoid ac-
countability, cover up mistakes, and confuse their interest with the public in-
terest.”). 
 18. Indeed, the committee’s recommendations focused heavily on how to 
ensure that such programs actually work and can therefore justify the privacy 
threats they raise. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PRO-
TECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISTS: A FRA-
MEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT 86 (2008) (“U.S. government agencies 
should be required to follow a systematic process . . . to evaluate the effective-
ness, lawfulness, and consistency with U.S. values of every information-based 
program . . . for detecting and countering terrorists before it can be deployed, 
and periodically thereafter.”). 
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sees such programs as a governance issue, not a technology is-
sue: The programs exist because data mining is just something 
the government does. To borrow Balkin’s phrase, it is part of 
the National Surveillance State. But viewing data mining as a 
technology problem instead of a governance problem forces 
every data mining program to justify its existence: It exposes 
data mining as simply a new tool to achieve a traditional end, 
focusing attention on whether each particular data mining pro-
gram can in fact achieve that end. 
  CONCLUSION   
In his essay, Professor Balkin asks whether the National 
Surveillance State will control us or whether we the citizenry 
will control it.19 This framing of the problem leaves the answer 
distressingly uncertain: It presents the State with a life of its 
own that only the popular will can tame. I am much more op-
timistic. The shift to computerization has changed the playing 
field of traditional government functions. In the new environ-
ment, some things that were hard have become easy; some 
things that were easy have become hard. It will take time for 
the legal system to appreciate the shift. Network technologies 
are new, and user experiences limited. But over time we will 
see that the basic game hasn’t changed. New laws are needed 
to respond to technological change. But the government’s func-
tions remain the same regardless of technology: Technology has 
changed how the government does its job, but the job itself re-
mains. As before, the legal restrictions on government practices 
are up to lawmakers, not the State itself—National Surveil-
lance or otherwise. 
 
 
 19. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 4 (“Will we have a government without 
sufficient controls over public and private surveillance, or will we have a gov-
ernment that protects individual dignity and conforms both public and private 
surveillance to the rule of law?”). 
